Intension and extension

Nope, that’s no typo in the title. I’ve been reading more about General Semantics. Here’s another part of Korzybski’s theory.

I’ve just read a bit about what Korzybski calls ‘describing by extension vs. describing by intension’. If you look up intension and extension in the Merriam Webster, you find that they are synonym to connotation and denotation. Denotation and connotation are nicely compared in the dictionary:
Connotation means: ‘an essential property or group of properties of a thing named by a term in logic’
Denotation means ‘the totality of things to which a term is applicable especially in logic’.

I think Korzybski’s words are easyer to memorize. For an INtensional definition you look INside the thing you want to define for properties and higher order abstractions. For an EXtensional definition you look EXternally for other EXamples for description. I remember similar definitions from basic mathematics where real numbers are extensionally defined as Z = {0,1,-1,2,-2,3,-3,4,-4,5,-5,…}. Whereas you could define even numbers intensionally as ‘any real number multiplied by two’, referring to a property of even numbers.

Now that we understand extensional and intensional, let’s get to Korzybski’s point: in standard logic, in most situations, we tend to ask for definitions in an intensionial way. We ask for descriptions with higher order abstractions if someone tries to explain a (new) word. ‘Intension’ is not a bad way to think and relate in, but Korzybski points out a few dangers and short comings of intensional definitions.
-As explained in my first GS post, you cannot be sure that other people share the same higher order abstractions. E.g. you can define Polyethylene as ‘a thermoplastic produced by the direct polymerization of ethylene at high temperatures and pressures’ but if you don’t know anything about organic chemistry, you have no clue as to what polymerization or ethylene really are. Is ethylene bigger than a rabbit? What sound does polymerization make?
-You overlook properties of things falling outside the definition. E.g. you can define war as ‘conflict, between relatively large groups of people, which involves physical force inflicted by the use of weapons.’ This allows you talk about war over a nice cup of tea and make many assumptions or reach conclusions without ever knowing the emotion, the smell, the fear and the ugliness of real war.
-You allow for un-sane generalizations. E.g. If you really dislike a guy named Smith, and you define Smith as ‘the only guy I know who likes Jazz music’, you tend to start disliking guys who like Jazz music. And as a result you might even start disliking Jazz music, because you don’t want to be associated with Smith and his hobby’s! But if you realize that Jazz-lover(Smith1) is different from Jazz-lover(Smith2) you would be more open to Jazz music. And if you realize that Smith(today) is a different guy from Smith(yesterday) you have no reason to keep the grudge against him.
So intensional definitions are OK if you know what you are doing, but generally it is 'saner' to refer to an actual and specific experience or set of experiences (extensional).

This is pretty complex theory, but what’s the use of it? What I intend to do with it is this:
-When I want to explain something new I’ll try to let the other people actually experience what I’m trying to explain. If that’s not possible I’ll try to find a metaphor or an example referring to a shared experience.
-I will start to collect a whole set of samples and examples of things I frequently need to show or explain.
-If someone wants to explain something to me, I’ll insist on examples and specific cases. If possible I’ll try to experience these first-hand. I’ll experiment with his reasoning, “to get a better feeling for it.”